39th PARLIAMENT,
1st SESSION
EDITED HANSARD • NUMBER 065
CONTENTS
Thursday, October 19, 2006
Citizenship Act--Bill C-14
[Table of Contents]
Mr. Ed Komarnicki (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration, CPC):
Mr. Speaker, I, perhaps, have a somewhat
tamer point of order which is in response to a previous point
raised. I want to clarify the facts referred to in the comments
made by the member for Burnaby—Douglas on Tuesday, October
17, when responding to the point of order I raised in respect
to Bill C-14.
Before making a ruling, I believe it is
important to note that the member was incorrect when he asserted
that the denial of citizenship to an adopted child was a de
facto denial of an immigration visa and permanent residence
status. The member made this argument to persuade you, Mr. Speaker,
that there was no difference between citizenship and immigration
matters so that you would conclude that the immigration appeal
division of the Immigration and Refugee Board may hear citizenship
matters.
The fact is that citizenship and permanent
residency each have a very different status in law. Indeed,
so substantial are the differences that each is defined in separate
statutes, as are the procedures and applications relevant to
them.
Mr. Speaker, the member would have you
overlook the fact that there is nothing in the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act that provides the Immigration and Refugee
Board with powers or a mandate to deal with citizenship. The
procedures and process for citizenship are limited to the Citizenship
Act. None of those procedures or processes refer to or relate
to the IRB.
More fundamental to the argument by the
member for Burnaby—Douglas is his incorrect assertion
that one can look past the lack of a citizenship mandate of
the IRB by finding that citizenship decisions have an impact
on the applicant's visa or permanent residence status application.
The member, simply put, was wrong.
The fact is that denial of citizenship
has little impact on permanent residence status. It is certainly
incorrect to say that a denial of citizenship is a de facto
denial of permanent residence. Under the current law it is possible
for a permanent resident to apply for citizenship and be denied
with the denial having no effect on his or her permanent residence
status.
The second significant error to the member's
submission that I wish to clarify is his suggestion that the
incompleteness of the amendments may be addressed by regulations
to Bill C-14 by stating:
...that requirements as to its operation
can be delineated in regulations developed to implement the
act, and therefore the amendment meets all the tests of completeness.
The member made this argument hoping to
persuade you, Mr. Speaker, to overlook the fact that the legislation
that creates the Immigration and Refugee Board does not already
recognize citizenship or a role for itself in dealing with citizenship
matters.
The member's submission that a new role
for the IRB can be delineated in regulations to Bill C-14 is
incorrect. I gave my remarks on October 6 on the inadmissibility
of an amendment that requires subsequent amendment of an act
that was not before the committee. I do not propose to repeat
those comments here but to simply respond to the member for
Burnaby—Douglas' contention and clarify that there are
no provisions in the Citizenship Act or the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act that would permit the making of regulations
that would change the existing mandate of the immigration appeal
division.
If his submission is to be taken as being
that the regulations to Bill C-14 can speak to the mandate and
powers of the immigration appeal division and broaden them to
allow the immigration appeal division to deal with a citizenship
matter, then I would refer to my previous comments on October
6 only to add that regulations to an amendment of the statute
may not amend another statute that was not before the committee.
In this instance, regulations to an amendment
to the Citizenship Act may not amend the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act which creates the mandate and powers of the immigration
appeal division.
With respect to the royal proclamation,
the argument essentially was that since there would no longer
be appeals under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
somehow these funds could be applied to appeals under the Citizenship
Act, is somewhat circular in the sense that if there is no appeal
provision in respect to the adoption provision in the Adoption
Act, moneys would be saved and in order for the appeal to happen
we would require additional funding which would require a royal
proclamation. For that reason, also, it would not be acceptable.